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STANLEY HAUERWAS AND THE LAW:  
IS THERE ANYTHING TO SAY? 
JOHN D. INAZU* 
It might seem odd to devote a symposium in a law journal to a theologian 
who has argued for withdrawal from any form of government that “resorts to 
violence in order to maintain internal order and external security”1 and who 
wonders whether lawyers “may in fact be going straight to hell.”2 If this is the 
starting point, then what conversation is to be had? But Stanley Hauerwas is 
closer to the law than most people realize. He has published in law reviews3 and 
taught in law schools.4 He has also signed amicus briefs,5 testified as an expert 
witness, and served as a jury foreman in a rape trial.6 
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 1. STANLEY HAUERWAS, Introduction, in CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE TODAY: ESSAYS ON CHURCH, 
WORLD, AND LIVING IN BETWEEN 1, 15 (1988) [hereinafter HAUERWAS, Introduction]. 
 2. Stanley Hauerwas, Christian Practice and the Practice of Law in a World Without Foundations, 
44 MERCER L. REV. 743, 750 (1993). 
 3. See Stanley Hauerwas & Michael Baxter, The Kingship of Christ: Why Freedom of “Belief” Is 
Not Enough, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 107 (1992); Stanley Hauerwas & Richard Church, The Art of 
Description: How John Noonan Reasons, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2001); Stanley Hauerwas & 
Thomas L. Shaffer, Hope in the Life of Thomas More, 54 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 569, 578 (1979); 
Hauerwas, supra note 2; see also Stanley Hauerwas, Sanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet, Faith in the 
Republic: A Francis Lewis Law Center Conversation, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467 (1988). 
 4. Hauerwas co-taught first-year contracts with Thomas Shaffer at Notre Dame Law School. 
Since 1988, he has held a joint appointment as Professor of Law and Divinity at Duke. Hauerwas has 
never presumed much about his law school appointment, once telling me that it functioned primarily so 
that “people like you could come take classes with me for credit.” 
 5. See Brief for 20 Theologians and Scholars of Religion as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 99-2036), 2000 WL 1803627; Brief  
for Michael J. Broyde, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff/Appellant, Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 
356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 01-4176), 2002 WL 32520423. 
 6. Hauerwas recounted these last two experiences at a meeting of the Christian Legal Society at 
Duke Law School on April 14, 2011. His personal engagement with the law is particularly important 
because of the ways in which he connects theology to personal narrative. By way of example, Hauerwas 
is well known for weaving forceful and frequent invocations of his Texan roots into his theological 
arguments. See, e.g., STANLEY HAUERWAS, A Tale of Two Stories: On Being a Christian and a Texan, 
00_FOREWORD (DO NOT DELETE) 11/19/2012  3:55 PM 
ii LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 75:i 
Of course, the academy is a bit more particular with its recognition—expert 
testimony and amicus briefs alone would not have led to a journal symposium. 
But beyond his moonlighting as a legal advocate, Hauerwas has emerged as one 
of the foremost scholars and public intellectuals of the last four decades. He has 
written scores of books and hundreds of articles,7 has been named “America’s 
Best Theologian” by Time magazine,8 and has delivered the prestigious Gifford 
Lectures.9 He has arguably “articulated the most coherent and influential 
political theology in and for the North American context”10 and has been “at the 
forefront of major transformations in theology” including virtue ethics, the role 
of narrative and community, and understandings of medicine and illness.11 
Hauerwas’s arguments have shaped theological education and reached a 
broader public through books and sermons—both his own and those of the 
pastors and educators whom he has influenced.12 His views have been 
scrutinized by some of the leading thinkers in religious studies,13 sociology,14 
history,15 political theory,16 moral philosophy,17 and literary theory.18 And they 
 
in CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE TODAY: ESSAYS ON CHURCH, WORLD, AND LIVING IN BETWEEN, supra 
note 1, at 25 [hereinafter A Tale of Two Stories]. For Hauerwas, what we believe and what we write 
have everything to do with the lives we live. These epistemic and theological commitments make any 
introduction to Hauerwas’s thought difficult absent some engagement with his biography and the 
intellectual influences that have shaped him. I do not attempt to make those connections here only 
because others have ably performed that task. See, e.g., William Cavanaugh, Stan the Man: A 
Thoroughly Biased Account of a Complete Unobjective Person, in STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE 
HAUERWAS READER 17 (John Berkman & Michael Cartwright eds., 2001); Charles R. Pinches, Kelly 
S. Johnson & Charles M. Collier, Introduction, in UNSETTLING ARGUMENTS: A FESTSCHRIFT ON THE 
OCCASION OF STANLEY HAUERWAS’S 70TH BIRTHDAY at ix (Charles R. Pinches, Kelly S. Johnson & 
Charles M. Collier eds., 2010) [hereinafter UNSETTLING ARGUMENTS]. Hauerwas’s autobiography also 
maps many of the connections between his life and work. See STANLEY HAUERWAS, HANNAH’S 
CHILD: A THEOLOGIAN’S MEMOIR (2010) [hereinafter HANNAH’S CHILD]. 
 7. In addition to more than forty books and 300 articles that he has authored, thirty books and 
dissertations have been devoted to his work. 
 8. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Christian Contrarian, TIME, Sept. 17, 2001, at 74. 
 9. Hauerwas’s Gifford Lectures are published in STANLEY HAUERWAS, WITH THE GRAIN OF 
THE UNIVERSE (2001). 
 10. R.R. Reno, Stanley Hauerwas, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO POLITICAL THEOLOGY 
302 (Peter Scott & William Cavanaugh eds., 2004) 
 11.  L. Gregory Jones, Reinhard Hutter & C. Rosalee Velloso Ewell, Engaging Stanley Hauerwas, 
in GOD, TRUTH, AND WITNESS: ENGAGING STANLEY HAUERWAS 7 (L. Gregory Jones, Reinhard 
Hutter & C. Rosalee Velloso Ewell eds., 2005) 
 12. By way of example, his book Resident Aliens (coauthored with William Willimon) has sold over 
75,000 copies. See STANLEY HAUERWAS & WILLIAM H. WILLIMON, RESIDENT ALIENS: LIFE IN THE 
CHRISTIAN COLONY (1989). John Berkman suggests that “Resident Aliens is probably the biggest-
selling work by an academic theological ethicist since Joseph Fletcher’s Situation Ethics in the 1960s.” 
John Berkman, Introduction to the Hauerwas Reader, in THE HAUERWAS READER, supra note 6, at 3. 
 13. See JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION (2004); Peter Ochs, Abrahamic 
Hauerwas, in GOD, TRUTH, AND WITNESS: ENGAGING STANLEY HAUERWAS, supra note 11. 
 14. See JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, TO CHANGE THE WORLD: THE IRONY, TRAGEDY & 
POSSIBILITY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE LATE MODERN WORLD (2010); Robert N. Bellah, God and 
King, in GOD, TRUTH, AND WITNESS: ENGAGING STANLEY HAUERWAS, supra note 11, at 112. 
 15. See Robert Louis Wilken, A Constantinian Bishop: St. Ambrose of Milan, in GOD, TRUTH, AND 
WITNESS: ENGAGING STANLEY HAUERWAS, supra note 11, at 73. 
 16. See STANLEY HAUERWAS & ROMAND COLES, CHRISTIANITY, DEMOCRACY, AND THE 
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have been largely ignored in legal scholarship.19 
The inattention to Hauerwas in legal scholarship is particularly odd given 
that he has written for decades about issues central to the law: violence, 
liberalism, bioethics, disability, interpretation, capital punishment, just war 
theory, reconciliation, public reason, patriotism, euthanasia, abortion, and 
religious freedom, to name only a few of the more obvious connections. And 
the general lack of familiarity with Hauerwas by legal scholars (even among 
many of those who write in the area of law and religion) has contributed to a 
growing divide. As Jeffrey Stout has observed, “[t]he more thoroughly 
Rawlsian our law schools and ethics centers become, the more radically 
Hauerwasian the theological schools become.”20   
* * * 
Hauerwas has been a persistent critic of contemporary liberal political 
thought.21 His arguments resemble those advanced by scholars ranging from 
Alasdair MacIntyre to Stanley Fish who, in different ways, challenge 
liberalism’s purported neutrality and its suppression of theological discourse.22 
 
RADICAL ORDINARY (2008); Elshtain, supra note 8 (“Before communitarianism became a buzzword, 
Hauerwas addressed community. Before the Americans with Disabilities Act, he wrote perhaps his 
most engaging work on persons with disabilities and how, as a community, we react to their presence. 
He anticipated debates about genetic manipulation. Before talk of ‘the virtues’ became widespread, 
Hauerwas wrote about the need for an account of our habits as members of communities.”). 
 17. See REVISIONS: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (Alasdair MacIntyre & 
Stanley Hauerwas eds., 1983); H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., The Belligerent Kingdom, in GOD, TRUTH, 
AND WITNESS: ENGAGING STANLEY HAUERWAS, supra note 11, at 193; Martha C. Nussbaum, A 
Reply to Stanley Hauerwas, 57 SOUNDINGS 725 (1989). 
 18. Stanley Fish wrote that Hauerwas “has been the most eloquent voice proclaiming the morality 
of particularism and the immorality of universalism.” THE HAUERWAS READER, supra note 6 
(endorsements). 
 19. As of this writing, Hauerwas has been cited only twenty-six times in the “top twenty” law 
reviews. Mark Tushnet, Michael Perry, and Thomas Shaffer account for one-third of those citations. 
Jeff Powell is an important exception not reflected in law review citation counts. See H. JEFFERSON 
POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL 
INTERPRETATION (1993) (based on a dissertation directed by Hauerwas); H. Jefferson Powell, The 
Earthly Peace of the Liberal Republic, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 91 (Michael 
W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001). 
 20. STOUT, supra note 13, at 75. 
 21. As Stephen Macedo notes in his essay, “liberalism” has many different meanings, and 
Hauerwas is not always entirely clear about which one he is invoking. See Stephen Macedo, Hauerwas, 
Liberalism, and Public Reason: Terms of Engagement?, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2012 at 
161, 162. I understand Hauerwas’s primary critiques to be directed at variants of Rawlsian liberalism 
that (1) privilege the individual, the right, and the autonomous over the community, the good, and the 
dependent; (2) facilitate unreflective allegiance to the nation-state; and (3) extract propositions from 
their background contexts. My own uses of the terms “liberalism” and “liberal political thought” in this 
introductory essay are intended to convey these three critiques. 
 22. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH: AND IT’S A GOOD 
THING, TOO 135 (1994) (“[W]hat if reason or rationality itself rests on belief? Then it would be the case 
that the opposition between reason and belief was a false one, and that every situation of contest 
should be recharacterized as a quarrel between two sets of belief with no possibility of recourse to a 
mode of deliberation that was not itself an extension of belief. This is in fact my view of the matter and 
I would defend it by asking a question that the ideology of reason must repress: where do reasons come 
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But Hauerwas differs from other well-known critics because he writes as a 
theologian. In other words, he is both echoing second-order arguments against 
the claims of liberalism and displaying first-order arguments from within a 
particular theological tradition. 
Some of Hauerwas’s critics may be right to argue that he “reacts against a 
type of liberalism that exists mostly on the pages of books by Rawls, Rorty, and 
their followers, and not in actual practice.”23 But that description is least true of 
the academy.24 Much teaching and scholarship relies upon unacknowledged 
constraints on argumentative practices from professors who embrace the ideals 
of Rawlsian public reason or, more strikingly, whose epistemic commitments 
welcome a spectacular diversity of viewpoints and worldviews—except for 
theological ones.25 As a result, a great deal of scholarship ignores or too easily 
dismisses theological argument.26 If public reason and epistemic bias have 
succeeded anywhere in squelching theological argument, it is in the academy. 
Contrary to the academy’s dominant orthodoxies, Hauerwas insists that 
Christian theology properly belongs in contemporary discourse: “[A]t the very 
least Christianity names an ongoing argument across centuries of a tradition 
which has established why some texts must be read and read in relation to other 
texts.”27 As a result, “Christians for all their shortcomings still represent an 
ongoing educated public that means they must . . . have agreements that make 
their disagreements intelligible.”28 It is for this reason that 
[Christians] should not avoid exploring what differences their convictions might make 
for why they do what they do. That difference will, of course, vary from subject to 
subject but surely such an investigation is the kind of work a university should 
 
from? The liberal answer must be that reasons come from nowhere, that they reflect the structure of 
the universe or at least of the human brain; but in fact reasons always come from somewhere, and the 
somewhere they come from is precisely the realm to which they are (rhetorically) opposed, the realm of 
particular (angled, partisan, biased) assumptions and agendas.”); ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, WHOSE 
JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 345 (1988) (“[L]iberalism can provide no compelling arguments in 
favor of its conception of the human good except by appeal to premises which collectively already 
presuppose that theory.”). 
 23. William T. Cavanaugh, A Politics of Vulnerability: Hauerwas and Democracy, in UNSETTLING 
ARGUMENTS, supra note 6, at 89, 91 (describing critiques raised in STOUT, supra note 13). 
 24. Cf. Michael W. McConnell, “God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!”: Freedom of Religion in 
the Post-modern Age, 1993 BYU L. REV. 163, 166 (“Religion has not been confined to the purely 
private, but informs discussions of justice and provides a framework for community. Unsecular 
America has not lost its voice. But in most of academia, and in many walks of life dominated by the 
secular elite, the news of the death of God has been taken to heart and the voice of religion is all but 
silenced.”); BRAD S. GREGORY, THE UNINTENDED REFORMATION: HOW A RELIGIOUS 
REVOLUTION SECULARIZED SOCIETY 298–364 (2012). 
 25. See id. (“[P]ost-modernists find it convenient to keep in place some of the intellectually 
discredited baggage of liberalism when the issue is religion.”). 
 26. Cf. Gregory P. Magarian, Religious Argument, Free Speech Theory, and Democratic 
Dynamism, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 119, 175 (2011) (“Our political culture pays little attention to the 
substance of religiously grounded arguments. That disregard—including disregard of critical 
disagreements—seriously diminishes the content of our public political debate.”). 
 27. STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE STATE OF THE UNIVERSITY: ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGES AND THE 
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 90 (2007). 
 28. Id. 
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sponsor. I obviously think that would be true of those working in other religious and 
nonreligious traditions. Of course, such work would make the university more 
conflictual but I see no reason why that is a disadvantage.
29
 
Hauerwas’s arguments echo Alasdair MacIntyre’s aspirations for the 
university “as a place of constrained disagreement, of imposed participation in 
conflict, in which a central responsibility of higher education would be to 
initiate students into conflict.”30 This process would require participants 
to enter into controversy with other rival standpoints, doing so both in order to exhibit 
what is mistaken in that rival standpoint in the light of the understanding afforded 
one’s own point of view and in order to test and retest the central theses advanced 
from one’s own point of view against the strongest possible objections to them to be 
derived from one’s opponents.
31
 
These kinds of challenges are particularly salient for law schools. Few 
people today believe that law is a science with precise answers that can be 
discovered through the right deductive reasoning.32 Once that kind of formalism 
is rejected, we are left to justify law through persuasion—a task made all the 
more important to the extent that legal scholarship and legal education help to 
situate legal practice.33 The enactment and enforcement of laws and judicial 
decisions separate the practice of law from the practice of academic inquiry—
many dimensions of legal practice have no analogue to ending a class with 
puzzled ambiguity or concluding a paper with questions for further study. Laws 
can be changed, but some resolution is always in force—and sometimes those 
resolutions limit freedom and kill people and destroy ways of life.34 The 
question for legal scholars is whether a dialogue of persuasion in the space 
between legal theory and legal practice is capacious enough for theological 
argument. 
Hauerwas’s work is not easily classified along familiar ideological lines.35 For 
all of his well-known critiques of contemporary liberalism, he has also rankled 
religious conservatives with his commitment to nonviolence and his 
 
 29. Id. at 91 n.19. 
 30. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY: ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 230–31 (1990). 
 31. Id. at 231. 
 32. Indeed, the rigid formalism ascribed to a past era of American jurisprudence may itself be 
overstated. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST–REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF 
POLITICS IN JUDGING 3 (2010) (“The story about the legal formalists is largely an invention. . . . Legal 
theory discussions of legal formalism are irrelevant, misleading, or empty.”). 
 33. The relationship between legal scholarship and legal practice is not always clear, as evidenced 
by the discussion that ensued following Chief Justice Roberts’s dismissal of the value of law review 
articles for the bar. See David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 20, 2011, at A1. 
 34. For a highly influential account, see Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(1983). 
 35. Indeed, even Hauerwas’s titles manage to offend across the political spectrum. See, e.g., 
STANLEY HAUERWAS, AFTER CHRISTENDOM: HOW THE CHURCH IS TO BEHAVE IF FREEDOM, 
JUSTICE, AND A CHRISTIAN NATION ARE BAD IDEAS (1991); STANLEY HAUERWAS, Why Gays (as a 
Group) are Morally Superior to Christians (as a Group), in THE HAUERWAS READER, supra note 6, at 
519. 
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epistemology.36 Consider, for example, one of his many one-liners: “Truth is not 
a set of propositions about the world; rather, truth is Jesus Christ.”37 Hauerwas 
takes both independent clauses seriously. The former is driven by his epistemic 
commitments; the latter by his ontological commitments. Neither can be 
separated from the kinds of arguments that he makes. Both are often elided by 
his interlocutors. Some religious conservatives who insist on decontextualized 
propositions (“The Bible says . . .”) miss the crux of Hauerwas’s argument that 
interpretations, including Biblical ones, are shaped by practices.38 Some secular 
liberals who dismiss even talk of Jesus miss the commitments that, for 
Hauerwas, drive everything. 
Hauerwas’s distance from both left and right ideologies also complicates his 
views about the relationship between “public” and “private,” a distinction that 
is both foundational to liberal theory and vulnerable to numerous critiques.39 
Hauerwas is simultaneously trying to explode and entrench the categories—his 
writing suggests that the oppositional terms are caught up in a category mistake. 
In one sense, the church is “private” vis-à-vis the “public” actors that constitute 
the state because the community of the church embodies a different way of 
life—a different kind of politics—than that of the state. Power and coercion can 
be abused on both sides of this institutional divide, but a theologically and 
constitutionally significant line remains.40 Yet at the same time, Hauerwas 
resists the ways in which liberal thought has “privatized” religious faith by 
recasting it as a politically irrelevant “belief.” Thomas Jefferson famously 
quipped that his neighbor’s mere belief “neither picks my pocket nor breaks my 
leg.”41 But religious belief is often most destabilizing and most politically 
significant when it inspires religious action.42 The hard questions of religious 
freedom emerge not from the interior of unspoken “belief,” but in word and 
 
 36. Hauerwas’s most concise argument against foundationalism can be found in the first thirty 
pages of STANLEY HAUERWAS, UNLEASHING THE SCRIPTURE: FREEING THE BIBLE FROM 
CAPTIVITY TO AMERICA (1993). His central interpretive claim is that an individual interpreter cannot 
discern the meaning of a text in isolation from his community. This primary claim includes two 
corollaries: (1) engaging with a community to discern the meaning of a text requires initiation and 
participation in the practices of the community; and (2) failing to recognize the need for this community 
inevitably leads to a reliance on individual subjective judgment masked as “common sense.” 
 37. WILLIAM WILLIMON & STANLEY HAUERWAS, LORD TEACH US: THE LORD’S PRAYER AND 
THE CHRISTIAN LIFE 16 (1996). 
 38. It is important here to address a tendency—particularly acute in the legal academy—to equate 
religious conservativism with fundamentalism. Some religious conservatives are fundamentalists (and 
foundationalists) who insist that the plain meaning of a text is readily apparent to any reader. But many 
religious conservatives are not foundationalists, and that is increasingly the case today—due at least in 
part to Hauerwas’s influence in theological education over the past forty years. 
 39. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989). 
 40. This dimension of Hauerwas’s thought is consistent with arguments made by a number of 
political theologians writing in an Augustinian vein. See, e.g., ERIC GREGORY, POLITICS AND THE 
ORDER OF LOVE: AN AUGUSTINIAN ETHIC OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP (2008); JOHN MILBANK, 
THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY (1990). 
 41. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 159 (William Peden ed., 1955) 
(1785). 
 42. See Hauerwas & Baxter, supra note 3. 
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deed. The boundaries of that freedom reflect an uneasy settlement of 
jurisdictional claims competing over the meanings of acts and allegiances. 
Hauerwas’s description of the “church as polis” contests the assumption that 
the nation-state—including, and perhaps especially, its legislators and judges—
is the ultimate arbiter of these meanings.43 In this sense, the church is essentially 
“public.” 
This dimension of Hauerwas’s writing calls to mind the powerful and 
controversial work of Robert Cover.44 A related idea in Cover’s work—the 
connection between law and violence—points toward a deep tension, or at least 
a deep ambivalence, in Hauerwas’s engagement with the law.45 Hauerwas is 
convinced that Christianity requires a commitment to pacifism, and he has been 
an outspoken opponent of capital punishment46 and modern conceptions of just 
war theory.47 He was, in fact, one of the lone public voices to criticize the 
military response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.48 Yet his 
pacifism—combined with his distrust of the nation-state—raises important 
questions about the extent to which he can sanction Christian participation in 
the law. 
It is too simplistic to contend that Hauerwas rejects this kind of participation 
outright. He has argued that “[w]hat is required for Christians is not withdrawal 
but a sense of selective service and the ability to set priorities.”49 This challenge 
“does not entail that Christians must withdraw from the economic, cultural, 
legal, and political life of our societies,” or “that Christians are to avoid all 
contact with the law or are in principle prevented from practicing law.”50 In fact, 
Hauerwas has written appreciatively of lawyers and the possibility of legal 
practice. In an essay coauthored with Jeff Powell, he lauded William 
Stringfellow’s “social witness of presence” and his ability “to practice law 
humanly.”51 And in an early essay coauthored with Thomas Shaffer, Hauerwas 
 
 43. See STANLEY HAUERWAS, IN GOOD COMPANY: THE CHURCH AS POLIS (1997). 
 44. See, e.g., Cover, supra note 34; Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 
(1986). The link between Cover and Hauerwas is largely unexplored in both legal and theological 
scholarship. 
 45. See Cover, supra note 44. To my knowledge, Hauerwas has not previously written about the 
implications of Cover’s arguments. In his response to this symposium, Hauerwas writes that Cover’s 
work “left a lasting impression.” Stanley Hauerwas, Hauerwas on “Hauerwas and the Law”: Trying to 
Have Something to Say, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2012 at 233, 238. 
 46.  See, e.g., Stanley Hauerwas, Punishing Christians: A Pacifist Approach to the Issue of Capital 
Punishment, in RELIGION AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A CALL FOR RECKONING 57 (E. Owens et al. 
eds., 2004). 
 47. See, e.g., STANLEY HAUERWAS & FRANK LENTRICCHIA, DISSENT FROM THE HOMELAND: 
ESSAYS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 (2003). 
 48. See id.; see also HAUERWAS, HANNAH’S CHILD, supra note 6, at 264–72 (discussing the 
challenges related to the positions he voiced after September 11). 
 49. HAUERWAS, Introduction, supra note 1, at 15. 
 50. STANLEY HAUERWAS, Why the “Sectarian Temptation” Is a Misrepresentation: A Response to 
James Gustafson, in THE HAUERWAS READER, supra note 6, at 90, 104. 
 51. Stanley Hauerwas & Jeff Powell, Creation as Apocalyptic: A Homage to William Stringfellow, 
in RADICAL CHRISTIAN AND EXEMPLARY LAWYER: HONORING WILLIAM STRINGFELLOW 31, 35, 37 
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praised the iconic Thomas More as an example “of those who wield power but 
who try to live truthfully.”52 
Yet Hauerwas has remained vague about what faithful legal practice might 
look like in contemporary American society—how Christian lawyers today 
might wield power and live truthfully. His worry that “the law has become 
increasingly coercive in the interest of maintaining order” suggests to him that 
“the Christians who presently serve as lawyers may find themselves in greater 
tension with their profession.”53 The concrete possibilities of navigating this 
tension seem even more elusive when one considers Hauerwas’s ardent 
pacifism in light of Cover’s memorable phrase that “legal interpretation takes 
place in a field of pain and death.”54 Here Hauerwas’s own participation in the 
law (his law teaching, amicus briefs, expert testimony, and jury service) 
complicates his critiques and pushes him for an account of what faithful 
practices might look like.55 
* * * 
 Engagement with theological argument is not easy—it requires patient 
reading and thinking, particularly from those confronting unfamiliar discourses 
and ideas. But the effort is both philosophically and vocationally warranted. 
With respect to the former, an openness to the “other” is a core dimension of 
the poststructuralist thought embraced by many legal scholars. With respect to 
the latter, the task of mediating unfamiliar concepts and ideas is part of what 
lawyers do.56 Our engagement with challenging ideas—including theological 
ones—helps us to make “connections to possible and plausible states of affairs” 
and to “integrate not only the ‘is’ and the ‘ought,’ but the ‘is,’ the ‘ought,’ and 
the ‘what might be.’”57 
The articles in this symposium further this engagement. They connect 
Hauerwas’s theological arguments to discrete areas of the law and engage more 
broadly in questions of political and legal theory. Bradley Wendel challenges 
Hauerwas’s reluctance to address the kinds of local conflicts that emerge from 
what Jeremy Waldron has called “the circumstances of politics.”58 Wendel 
 
(Andrew W. McThenia, Jr. ed., 1995). 
 52. Hauerwas & Shaffer, supra note 3, at 583. Hauerwas and Shaffer also argue that “the most 
elementary hope that law has” is that “analysis and knowledge will go a long way toward containing 
power.” Id. at 578. 
 53. Hauerwas, A Tale of Two Stories, supra note 6, at 104–05. 
 54. Cover, supra note 44, at 1601. 
 55. Cf. STANLEY HAUERWAS, PERFORMING THE FAITH: BONHOEFFER AND THE PRACTICE OF 
NONVIOLENCE 239 (“I do not believe pacifists are any less implicated in the violence that grips our 
lives than those who believe that violence is a ‘necessary evil.’”). 
 56. I focus here on lawyers because the symposium explores connections between theology and 
law. But not all of those facilitating these connections are trained as lawyers or teach in law schools: 
James Logan is a theologian, and Steve Macedo is a political theorist. 
 57. See Cover, supra note 34. 
 58. W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyering in the Christian Colony: Some Hauerwasian Themes, 
Reflections, and Questions, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2012 at 1; see JEREMY WALDRON, 
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argues that “the law provides a means to balance and resolve competing 
considerations, such as the need for economic development and the protection 
of the environment, in a way that allows citizens to treat one another with 
respect.”59 He is not overly sanguine—he observes “striking” parallels between 
Hauerwas’s theological critiques and non-theological critiques suggesting that a 
legal ethics grounded in “thin, procedural values cuts lawyers off from the 
moral resources that would give meaning to their professional lives.”60 But 
Wendel pushes Hauerwas toward a more hopeful view of legal practice. 
Elizabeth Schiltz enlists Hauerwas to critique contemporary approaches to 
disability law.61 Beginning with Hauerwas’s observation that “[n]o group 
exposes the pretensions of the humanism that shapes the practices of modernity 
more thoroughly than the mentally handicapped,”62 Schiltz explores some of the 
deep tensions in contemporary disability rights theory—including the 
implications for selective abortions and withholding of medical treatment. She 
builds upon observations by legal scholar Samuel Bagenstos but suggests that 
Hauerwas’s arguments expose significant problems in Bagenstos’s attempts to 
reconcile the tensions.63 Schiltz situates much of her article in Hauerwas’s 
reflections on L’Arche, “an international federation of small, residential faith-
centered communities where people with and without intellectual disabilities 
live together in friendship.”64 
Michael Moreland explores the significance of Hauerwas’s writing to 
bioethics.65 Moreland examines the ways in which the philosophical framing of 
intentional torts—an important antecedent to the law of bioethics—“has 
become muddled in ways that Hauerwas’s own critique of bioethics and his 
earliest work in the philosophy of action indicate.”66 Moreland traces the 
significance of Elizabeth Anscombe’s work on intention to Hauerwas’s own 
thinking and then explains the implications of Hauerwas’s observations on the 
“confusion about intention” for notions of harm in legal doctrine.67 This 
 
LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999). 
 59.  Wendel, supra note 58, at 17. 
 60. Id. at 3. Wendel has himself advanced some of these non-theological critiques in W. BRADLEY 
WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010). 
 61. Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Hauerwas and Disability Law: Exposing the Cracks in the Foundations of 
Disability Law, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2012 at 23. 
 62. Stanley Hauerwas, Timeful Friends: Living with the Handicapped, in CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 
ON STANLEY HAUERWAS’ THEOLOGY OF DISABILITY 11, 14 (John Swinton ed., 2004). 
 63. See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT (2009). 
 64. Schiltz, supra note 61, at 25. For Hauerwas’s reflections on L’Arche, see STANLEY HAUERWAS 
& JEAN VANIER, LIVING GENTLY IN A VIOLENT WORLD (2008). Vanier founded the first L’Arche 
community in Trosly-Breuil, France, in 1964. Today L’Arche has over 150 communities operating in 
forty different countries. See L’ARCHE INTERNATIONALE, www.larche.org (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). 
 65. Michael P. Moreland, Mistakes About Intention in the Law of Bioethics, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 4, 2012 at 53. 
 66. Id. at 54. 
 67. Id. at 62. 
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confusion extended into the law of bioethics as philosophical argument in that 
area came to be dominated by autonomy and consequentialism—a confusion 
evidenced in some of the arguments advanced in the “right to die” cases, 
Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill.68 Drawing from these 
contemporary examples, Moreland shows the continued relevance of 
Hauerwas’s arguments to emerging questions of bioethics. 
James Logan considers the difference that Christian theology might make in 
addressing the state of punishment and incarceration in the United States.69 His 
vision of “good punishment” embodies a “politics of healing the memories of 
wrongdoing by way of the acknowledgement of sin within a communal setting 
of forgiveness and reconciliation.”70 Reading Logan’s article, one is struck by 
the visceral language that situates his argument, including a gruesome and 
detailed account of prison rape by a self-described “Black punk.”71 A few 
sentences later, he appeals to “the memory of an executed-yet-living God to 
guide us while living at the crossroads of Good Friday and Easter.”72 These two 
descriptions are bound to encounter different receptions in the socially 
conditioned guild of legal scholars. We know what to do with the first one—
critical theory has rightly shown us that we cannot begin to understand the 
plight of a “Black punk” or the social reality that he embodies if we sanitize his 
story or extract it from the background context that made it possible. But 
Logan’s second description warrants the same epistemic charity; indeed, it is the 
only way to make sense of what he means by the possibility of “good 
punishment.” 
Charlton Copeland explores the narrative dimension of Hauerwas’s 
theology and asks whether legal and theological reflections on the politics of 
liberation push Hauerwas toward a more capacious and open-ended conception 
of narrative.73 Copeland draws connections between narrative arguments that 
took shape in law and theology in response to critiques of modernist 
assumptions in both disciplines. As he notes, proponents of “legal storytelling” 
use narrative to “critique, reject, and ultimately transform the dominant 
paradigms of the larger society,” while Hauerwas’s “narrative theology project 
aims to recover an authentic Christian identity for the Christian community’s 
self-understanding, rather than for its comprehension by the external 
 
 68. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
 69. James Logan, Healing Memory, Ontological Intimacy, and U.S. Imprisonment: Toward a 
Christian Politics of “Good Punishment” in Civil Society, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 4, 2012 at 
77. William Stuntz’s posthumously published work on criminal law draws upon related ideas in a non-
theological context and might offer one of the best examples of “translation” in this difficult area of 
law. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011). 
 70. Logan, supra note 69, at 79. 
 71. Id. at 85–86. 
 72. Id. at 86. 
 73.  Charlton C. Copeland, Creation Stories: Stanley Hauerwas, Same-Sex Marriage, and Narrative 
in Law and Theology, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 4, 2012 at 87. 
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community.”74 Copeland considers the implications of these different narrative 
frameworks for same-sex marriage debates. 
David Skeel focuses on what he calls the “prophetic temptation” in 
Hauerwas’s writing—taking “prophetic stances” on public issues but showing 
less willingness to “intervene[] more directly in the political process.”75 Skeel 
contrasts Hauerwas’s theological ethics with the “social optimism” of Walter 
Rauschenbusch and the “pragmatic” accommodation of Reinhold Niehbuhr.76 
Despite Hauerwas’s concern that political involvement could “dilute the 
visibility of the church,”77 Skeel contends that “Hauerwasian theology does not 
preclude participatory engagement.”78 He develops his arguments with three 
examples: the Civil Rights Movement, abortion, and debt relief laws. Skeel 
suggests that Hauerwas’s abortion writings “gesture toward [the] possibility” of 
a participatory role for the church,”79 and challenges Hauerwas (and those 
influenced by his ideas) to engage in “the political debate over the legal 
structure of debt and debt relief.”80 
Cathleen Kaveny explores connections between Hauerwas’s work and 
contract law, building upon “the historical and normative overlap between the 
notions of ‘covenant’ and ‘contract.’”81 She turns to the theologian Karl Barth to 
frame “the possibilities for ad hoc engagement of theology and secular 
disciplines.”82 Kaveny also contends that Hauerwas should welcome Paul 
Ramsey’s account of natural law “because it privileges the context-dependent, 
narrative-oriented approach of the common law as a locus for the articulation 
of moral norms.”83 She concludes by suggesting that these narrative insights 
would be particularly fruitful in exploring “the norms embedded in and 
illustrated by the cases of contract law.”84  
Stephen Macedo offers a more critical take on Hauerwas’s challenges to the 
narratives of contemporary liberalism.85 Macedo questions Hauerwas’s 
uniformly negative description of the liberal project and his reliance on political 
 
 74.  Id. at 91. 
 75. David A. Skeel, Jr., Hauerwasian Christian Legal Theory, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 
2012 at 115, 116, 124. 
 76. Id. at 117, 121. 
 77. Id. at 123. 
 78. Id. at 124. 
 79. Id. at 126. 
 80. Id. at 131. 
 81. Cathleen Kaveny, Hauerwas and the Law: Framing a Productive Conversation, 75 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2012 at 135, 136. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 155. 
 84. Id. at 159. 
 85. Macedo, supra note 21. For illustrative examples of Macedo’s writing on public reason, see 
STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL 
DEMOCRACY (2000); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The 
Case of God v. John Rawls, 105 ETHICS 468 (1995); Stephen Macedo, The Constitution, Civic Virtue, 
and Civil Society: Social Capital as Substantive Morality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573 (2001). 
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theorists like Alasdair MacIntyre and Sheldon Wolin. As Macedo writes, “[i]t is 
hazardous and unfair to interpret a tradition of thought based mainly on the 
claims of its harshest critics, as if taking one’s bearings on Christianity from the 
late Christopher Hitchens.”86 Macedo suggests that Hauerwas look more 
charitably at, or work toward a better description of, the “moral core” of the 
liberal project, which emphasizes “the political importance of equal basic 
individual rights” and “the demand that legitimate governments must secure 
citizens in a range of basic rights and that the people must be able to hold their 
governments accountable.”87 He argues that liberalism must be understood as a 
practical and moral program for responding to a variety of problems—including 
the problem of establishing peaceful democracies in conditions of religious and 
ethical diversity. Macedo suggests that many of Hauerwas’s critiques miss the 
moral core and the practical orientation of liberalism, and that once these are 
appreciated there may be more common ground than Hauerwas allows. 
My contribution uses Hauerwas to critique Ronald Dworkin’s theory of 
legal interpretation.88 I pay particular attention to Dworkin’s assertion in Justice 
in Robes that “[j]udges may not appeal to religious convictions or goals in 
liberal societies because such convictions cannot figure in an overall 
comprehensive justification of the legal structure of a liberal and tolerant 
pluralistic community.”89 I contend that this constraint unjustifiably excludes 
Hauerwas’s arguments from our common enterprise of legal interpretation and 
illustrate my claim by comparing the ways in which both thinkers approach the 
abortion controversy. 
Stephen Carter’s article returns to one of the fundamental questions of law 
and one of the fundamental challenges to Hauerwas’s engagement with the law: 
“Must liberalism be violent?”90 Carter draws attention to Hauerwas’s 
nonviolence and suggests that “his views on the violence of war and his views 
on the violence of the liberal state are inextricably linked.”91 But Carter argues 
that this connection need not make the liberal state “irredeemable.”92 To the 
contrary, the critiques of liberalism that emerge from Hauerwas’s thought may 
have “important implications for public policy” and the law reform project.93 
The articles are followed by a dialogue between Professor Hauerwas and 
Professor H. Jefferson Powell.94 The transcribed dialogue took place at a 
 
 86. Macedo, supra note 21, at 169. Other contributors to this symposium make similar 
observations. See Wendel, supra note 58, at 3–4. 
 87. Macedo, supra note 21, at 162–163. 
 88. John D. Inazu, The Limits of Integrity, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2012 at 181. 
 89. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 254 (2006). 
 90. Stephen L. Carter, Must Liberalism Be Violent?, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2012 at 201. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 215. 
 93. Id. at 201, 215–216. 
 94. A Dialogue Between a Theologian and a Lawyer, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no 4, 2012 at 221. 
Professors Powell and Hauerwas were for many years colleagues at Duke, and Hauerwas supervised 
Powell’s doctoral studies that formed the basis of Powell’s Moral Tradition, supra note 19. For some 
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conference at Duke University School of Law on September 9, 2011 that 
included presentations based on early drafts of these symposium articles.95 The 
dialogue between Hauerwas and Powell covers a range of topics including the 
formation of law students, the civil rights movement, and the role of violence in 
the law. 
Professor Hauerwas’s response to the articles deepens some of the 
connections that others in this symposium have drawn between his work and 
legal theory.96 He suggests that lawyers have assumed a privileged role in our 
society because the law “became the only means we had to resolve moral 
disputes.”97 For this reason, “the law can manifest the deepest theological and 
moral commitments of a people,”98 and legal theory maintains “a deep regard 
for the continuing moral intelligibility of the law in what many regard as a 
morally unintelligible society if not universe.”99 But, as Hauerwas writes, 
“[t]here is only one problem—it is politics all the way down.”100 With that claim, 
Hauerwas reasserts his charge that “[l]iberal political practice and ideology 
makes it impossible for liberals to recognize that they are exercising hegemonic 
power in the name of choice.”101 And yet these arguments, familiar to 
Hauerwas’s readers, do not preclude his appreciation for the law. The law 
manifests power, but “power can also often be an alternative to violence.”102 
And while “[t]he law certainly can be one of the forms that violence takes,” the 
law “can also be a gift that allows us to have as well as resolve conflicts without 
killing one another.”103 
This symposium is not a Festschrift for Stanley Hauerwas.104 The 
contributors include not only longtime friends and former students but also 
critics and strangers to his work. The articles reveal disagreement with 
Hauerwas’s ideas, suppositions, and methodologies. But their engagement with 
Hauerwas, and his response, take seriously the possibility of theological 
argument in law—the possibility that there is something to be said. 
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